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The Mediterranean - Security Turnstile: An overview 
From the Barcelona Process to the Union for the Mediterranean
 
 
Astrid B. Boening
 
 
Abstract  
This paper seeks to expand the theoretical concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex 
(MERSC) (Buzan and Waever 2004), based on the literature (e.g. on security, regional integration, 
development and global governance) towards a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex 
(EMRSC).  The center of an EMRSC lies in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean
1, rather than in the 
Middle East, as Buzan and Waever (Ibid., map) proposed.  
While some authors have pointed to the hesitance of the southern Mediterranean towards the north, 
regional economic integration is not new to the Mediterranean, but was present extensively e.g. between 
the ancient Venetian traders and the Middle East for over two millennia, prevailing economically when 
political and military harmony had ceased (Spence 2007).  
This paper suggests that the member states of the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), as the 
successor program of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) (also referred to as the Barcelona Process), have 
reached a proactive commitment to a broader framework for national development and reform programs 
(Wurzel 203, 8) in the greater interregional context of the Euro-Mediterranean, addressing those goals 
which were not achieved in many security sectors and levels (Buzan and Waever 2003) within its 
predecessor program, the EMP.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper I seek to explore a region of the world, the Mediterranean, which has through the millennia 
been significant as a passageway for peoples, their trade and cultures. Previous experiences with regional 
Mediterranean integration, such as the Roman Empire or the spread of Christianity in the East and West 
Roman Empires were certainly not always peaceful.   
          In  this  paper  the  complex  political,  economic and social interrelationships in the EuroMed 
Partnership (EMP) (also known as the Barcelona Process) (compare Appendix 1), an IGO, which was “re-
                                                           
    
 Paper accompanying Poster Presentation in Section TD 94: “Security Architectures in the Twenty First Century – 
Comparative Interdisciplinary Studies” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention New York, NY February 15-
18, 2009. 
   
 Astrid Boening, PhD-candidate in International Studies(University of Miami, Coral Gables/FL) has also studied international 
economics and marketing at the Rome campus of Georgetown University, and Latin American economics and marketing in Costa 
Rica, Chile and Brazil through George Washington University, as well as at the United Nations in New York. She was recently 
chosen as the junior researcher to represent the U.S. Atlantic Council at the Palermo Atlantic Forum on the Mediterranean in 
Sicily. Her master’s thesis fieldwork was undertaken in Trieste, Italy, at the Central European Initiative. Her PhD paper focuses 
on the security implications of the EuroMed Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean, and is supported by a grant from the 
European Commission through the Miami European Union Center. She has worked extensively on all continents for several 
MNC’s in the telecommunications, air transport and finance fields, and is currently the Associate Director of the University of 
Miami European Union Center. Astrid Boening has presented her work frequently internationally, and has published numerous 
articles on multilateralism and security in the Mediterranean.  
1 1 The buffer states of an EMRSC would be e.g. the eastern EU neighborhood states (in contrast to the Scandinavian and the 
Balkans as Buffer States in a MERSC). The insulator states of an EMRSC would i.a. equatorial AfHca. A super-and great power 
would be Russia. A subcomplex would be e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council, with an Asian supercomplex (compare Ibid.).  
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launched” on July 13, 2008 as the “Union for the Mediterranean” (UMed)
2, are examined in terms of their 
impact on (inter-regional) security in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Euro-Med). 
 
  Figure 1: EuroMed Partnership Member States 2008 
         (Blue: EU Member countries, Turquoise: EU-Candidate Countries, Green: 
         MNMCs, Yellow: Observer Country) (Source: Wikipedia). 
 
           The EMP represents a modus operandi for regional integration in the Mediterranean. It is intended 
to serve not simply as a peaceful “bridge” not between “Them” and “Us”, or “the West” and “the Rest”, 
but utilizes approaches beyond functionalism and institutionalism, which have been historically successful 
in integrating neighboring countries that had an extensive history of “un-neighborly” relations. An 
example would be France and Germany, which were able to integrate into a structure eventually, i.e. the 
European Union (EU), which has brought not only prosperity, but also peace to these countries for the past 
sixty years. This paper examines i.a. whether there is in fact integration occurring in the Mediterranean 
region through the activities of the EMP, and how this reflects on its inter-regional implications.  While 
the EMP, as a North-South integration project, has the aim of security through the EU’s democratic 
principles of inclusion, and rejecting explicit power politics among the member states (Vasconcelos 2004, 
8), the Euro-Med as a region has been the stage to continuing hard-power confrontations during the 
existence of the EMP, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese civil war, Algerian internal 
“turmoil”, and other “incidents”. One major difference between soft and hard power is the former’s long 
“leadtime” vs. the greater potential for “immediacy” of hard power.  
  
Background: European Security Context 
 
With the end of the Cold War, the EC recognized “the transition to a new European order as a positive 
opportunity to develop its external role” (Pace 2003, 164). Hence it appears appropriate to position the 
EMP, beyond its three-basket parameters also as an intra- and interregional dynamic per se, e.g. within the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and potentially with the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). and IGOs.     
           The European Security Strategy (ESS), initiated in 2003, lists the threats of the 21
st century as 
follows: failed and rogue states, regional conflicts, civil wars, political instability and terrorism, as they 
have implications for the EU at the global, regional and (member) state levels (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6). 
Potential threats are particularly emphasized in the ESS at the regional level, as they are particularly 
relevant to the EU for their proximity to it, and due to the socio-economic and political heterogeneity of its 
neighborhood. 
 
 
                                                           
    
2 Since the UMed is only a couple of months old at the time of writing (and its initial progress by the EU French presidency 
delayed by intervening priorities), this paper will focus on the EMP, in whose footsteps the UMed follows 5 
 
        Rosa Balfour (2004, 1) writes that 
 
      the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms 
such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its capabilities as a ‘civilian power’, it has 
sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of 
building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through 
persuasion rather than coercion.  
 
She observes (2004, 1) that the Wider Europe Strategy, published by the Commission in March 2003, and 
the new European Security Strategy, prepared by the High Representative for CFSP the same year 
“propose major conceptual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, 
could transform the EU’s still hesitant status as an international actor”.    
         The  debate  surrounding  basic  and  comprehensive security revolves around general as well as 
universal values and their policy implementation (Aliboni 2002, 11), which may be either more 
immediate, or address broader issues, involving political, economic, and/or socio-cultural responses, as 
well as more longterm crisis management, such as through peacekeeping and peace-building as a 
structural approach to national or regional instability from the perspective of the EU. Evaluating the EMP 
from these policy considerations, we observe that its basic institutional structure follows this paradigm. 
The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the CFSP as the forum for EU-
foreign ministers and the political Committee of the EU explicitly underlined in its concluding remarks on 
18/19 June 2007 that strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) represents a core foreign 
policy which should continue dynamically, particularly by exploring the alignment of the EU’s 
Mediterranean partners with EU declarations, demarches, and positions on CFSP issues as other ENP 
members (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have decided to do. Some authors (Danreuter 2006, 
quoted in Senyucel et al. 2006, 6) have stated that “the EU has realized that actualizing its ambitions at the 
international scale is very much related to how successful it is in its regional policies” (italics added).  
          The recognition that no European country can tackle today’s complex security challenges alone led 
in December 2001 also to the adoption of a declaration on the operational capability of the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (European Commission CFSP 2008) by the European Council at 
Laeken, recognizing the EU’s capability – and responsibility – to conduct some crisis management 
operations.  Heisbourg (2001, 8), who writes that the “ESDP and its Rapid Reaction Force does not exist 
in a historical vacuum”. On October 1, 2008 EU defense ministers met to focus on building a European 
fleet of helicopters and transport planes (in light of the deployment of the EU mission to Georgia on the 
same day, which highlighted a logistics deficit in this regard) (EurActiv 10/1/08). While previously EU 
peacekeeping missions, such as the one deployed in Chad had to rely on external contributions, such as 
from Russia, the EU can no longer afford this dependency. This expansion in EU defense logistics 
includes initial talks for joint EU officer training, “inspired by the ERASMUS student exchange 
programme” (Ibid.). While this indicates certainly a continued defensive EU, it suggests a deeper military 
integration, triggered by necessity arising from external circumstances as mentioned above. 
            
Interregional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean 
 
Against this background of the CFSP, this section will examine the parameters of a possible Euro-
Mediterranean Regional Security Complex Structure. The discussion of security cooperation is 
significant in the contemporary international system as it is taking place in a dynamic of a declining 
prominence of military alliances, and the reciprocal rise in importance of composite regional security 
frameworks (Attina 2005, 3): following the end of Cold War, bilataralism, the “de-polarization [since 
then] of the international system” (Ibid.) has affected nations’ security cooperative behavior. Hence the 
past twenty years are a prime example of the time changes in security practices through the development 
of new ones, especially as this security cooperation is not only positively, but also functionally related to 
increased inter-regional economic cooperation (Ibid.). While through the ages foreign trade was protected 6 
 
more by a nation’s own military capacity (e.g. the armadas), today (especially regional) trade experiences 
“front-line” protection through the institutional framework of cooperative political
3 and economic 
agreements, bolstered by socio-cultural confidence building measures (Attina 2005, 3). This “security 
regionalism” (Ibid.) has been analyzed in terms of levels of conflict and security among states of different 
regions (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993 and Kakowitz, 1998, quoted in Attina 2005, 4), or in terms of the 
relationship between conflict, integration and democracy (Gleditsch, 2002 quoted in Attina 2005, 4), in 
addition to the other theories on war and regional integration, such as (neo-) realism, liberal 
institutionalism, (neo-) functionalism, and social constructivism. 
          However, this “security regionalism”, based on regional security partnerships, holds for analytical 
purposes (Attina 2005, 5) that states, who have come to an agreement on “co-managing security 
problems” as a result of their realization of reciprocal interdependence, as well as common dependence on 
transnational problems, and, significantly, the “international relations in the regional are not polarized by 
great power competition” (Ibid., italics added). I would consider that the hegemonic impetus in the 
establishment of an effective intergovernmental organization can, however, not be ruled out yet
4. Hence 
the EMP indicates a very diverse number of accomplished milestones since 1995, because the EU does not 
represent a “great power” polarization in it (countering the colonial argument raised against it), though 
contributed substantially both with logistic as well as financial support to development in a region with 
millennia of disharmonious political and socio-economic relations. 
           This evolution in a regional security partnership received a new impetus following 9/11 through the 
“new discourse of threat and danger” (Attina 2005, 9) as national responses to deal with rogue states and 
political actors deemed aggressive and unreceptive to cooperative mechanisms. While these actors cannot 
be judged irrational from their viewpoint in attempting to achieve their own political agenda, states have 
taken steps to dissuade their interests, i.a. by enhancing their own military facility, “including the 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy” (ESDP) for worldwide use, and in some cases, 
the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and 
peace” (Ibid.). As a further authoritative speech act of a decade-long scholar in this area, this statement 
would confirm the identification of the Euro-Med beyond a Regional Security Complex as a Regional 
Security Super Complex transatlantically 
            Collective security involves keeping the armed forces under national control, but states agree to 
make them available to intervene against an aggressor in a third country (Attina 2004, 3). The regions 
surrounding the EU have been termed part of the “new strategic geography” (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6) 
(emphasis added). Many of these regions are the sources of instability, yet rich in natural resources, 
especially critical energy reserves, which make successful relations with these neighbors essential (Ibid.). 
EMP-member states, in addition to their shared history and geographical space, and through their formal 
inter-linkage of the “three-basked”-parameters”
5 of the Barcelona Process per se are also formally linked 
                                                           
      
3 Compare the announcement by the UN (Financial Times 11/3/08) that its forces would patrol the Straight of Hormuz against 
piracy  
    
4 In accordance with regime theory (e.g. Ruggie 1999). 
    
5 These are: a) The political and security partnership with the aim of strengthening the political dialogue is based on 
“observance of essential principles of international law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external 
stability” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). EMP partners agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and 
freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, 
nationality, language, religion or sex”(EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration) as well as other obligations under 
international law, including their regional and international agreements.   
       b)  As both Abdullahtif Ahmida (2000) and Joffé (2001, 34) point out, already the 1957 Treaty of Rome made specific 
provisions for the economic relationship between the Maghrib and the EC. However, while these were based stronger on colonial 
patters of the former as a raw material and labor supply, and market for EC/EU goods, the economic aspect of the EMP is 
directed towards economic development in MENA to reduce the gap between the northern and the southern periphery of the 
Mediterranean. 
       c)  Some writers view the social-cultural “basket” of the EMP as “mainly aspirational in nature…, primarily devoted to 
supporting the growth of civil society in the South” (Joffé 2001, 38), while the EMP’s documents also indicate plans to develop 7 
 
beyond mere diplomatic and foreign policy ties through a complex structure of “formal” hard and soft 
security ties, including conflict resolution. 
          Attina (2004, 2) (emphasis added) points out that “the construction of security co-operation in the 
Mediterranean region” rests in the design of two constellations within the EMP: the multi-dimensional 
strategy of its three Chapters, and the specific initiatives of the partners within the First Chapter frame. 
“For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration [represents] the fundamental agreement of a regional security 
system that … create[s] the operative mechanisms and measures that set up a comprehensive and 
cooperative security” (Ibid.) partnership. Attina (2004, 2) suggests analyzing security systems according to 
the level of institutionalization in their security cooperation, as well as the social integration of their 
members, represented by the following graph (after Attina 2004, 3): 
 
No formal                                                                                                         Amalgamated 
Security 
Arrangement  x----------x---------------x----------x------x---------x------------x      community 
                                       A                   B             C         D1         D2 
A:   Opposite Alliance System 
B:   Collective security 
C:   Regional security partnership 
D1: Loosely coupled Pluralistic security community 
D2: Tightly coupled Pluralistic security community 
 
The European security system evolved from an Opposite Alliance System since the 1970s towards greater 
security integration, while the southern Mediterranean portion of the EMP is currently not an Opposite 
Alliance System, but has the potential to develop in either direction, depending on the institutional and 
political context, according to Attina (2004, 3).  
          European stability overall is based on several premises, i.a. economic prosperity and continued 
growth in its “neighborhood” as discussed above in the context of the EMP’s three Chapters. The EU’s 
CFSP, which was only three years old upon the founding of the EMP, evolved parallel to it with the 
objectives of safeguarding the common values and fundamental interests, independence and integrity of 
the EU, in compliance with UN principles and those set out in the Helsinki Declaration (EU website). 
Nevertheless, there is also a marked asymmetry in security institutions between the countries of the 
northern and the southern Mediterranean due to the density of institutional development, much more so in 
the former and somewhat less in the latter (Vasconcelos 1999, 29). Other regional integration projects in 
MENA, such as the Arab League or the Arab Maghreb Union, did not develop a real security dimension, 
partially due to the stalled Middle East peace process and its “brake” on South-South integration. In this 
context, the EMP is by far the most significant security mechanism in the Euro-Med due to its multilateral 
character, and its “multi-layered” dimensions (Ibid., 30).    
          Some scholars have accused the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU for an extension of 
territory, and herewith power. I would view the EMP rather as a model for assisting its member states to 
develop politically, economically and socially, in order to contribute to internal (national) stability as well 
as to discourage the southern neighbors of the EU to emigrate illegally in droves to the EU north of the 
Mediterranean. Additionally, especially thanks to the EMP financial programs, the Middle East 
Development Assistance (MEDA), the EMP political/security, economic/financial and socio-cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (e.g. European 
Commission 2000, 2006, 2007), aims which have been substantially supported in turning them into reality by NGOs such as the 
Anna Lindh Foundation. The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the 
Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, scientific and technological levels are 
essential factors in bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of 
each other. 8 
 
options and tools available to all members, such as through a harmonization of practices, for the potential 
integration into some areas of the EMP of the EU’s “Four Freedoms” (goods, people, services and capital), 
and for the mutual security-reinforcing effect they have on a peaceful coexistence in the culturally, 
politically and economically diverse North African and Middle Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU.  
Organization for Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE) 
          Security  cooperation  towards  the  end  of the Cold War and the years following it needs to be 
understood in the context of the OSCE and its preceding Charters, which led to its establishment and 
evolution. The OSCE, with currently fifty-six member countries, is the largest security organization. It 
builds on the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of the early 1970s (culminating in 
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975) as a forum of dialogue between East and West. As the above map shows, 
it involves a broad  
 
 
 
Figure 5: OSCE Member states (green), Partners for Cooperation (orange) 
Source: Wikipedia (July 31, 2008) 
 
membership ranging from North America to five former Soviet Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, 
Kirghizistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and the European countries in addition to the 
Partners for Cooperation countries. 
          Following the shifting security dynamics post-Cold War it was decided during the Paris Conference 
of 1990 (culminating in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe) that the OSCE’s activities should evolve 
from predominantly meetings and conferences to greater field involvement, i.a. through the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, in addition to the field missions and activities in member 
countries (Ghebali and Warner, 2001 and Hopmann, 2003, quoted in Attina 2005, 8). This security 
structure complements the European Security Partnership as operative agreements to the declarations of 
fundamental agreements (Attina 2005, 8). Its first test during the Balkan unrest at the end of the last 
century showed which of these aspects required improvement. 
         The significance of both the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe lies in providing the intellectual basis, as well as the structural frameworks for other regional 
security partnerships and communities, such as the EMP. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 already 
contained a Three-Basket structure, i.e. the “Principles Guiding Relations between States” as follows: 
 
1.     Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty 
2.     Refraining from the threat or use of force 
3.     Inviolability of frontiers 
4.     Territorial integrity of States 
5.     Peaceful settlement of disputes 
6.     Non-intervention in internal affairs 
7.     Respect for human rights and fundamental 
         freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
         belief 9 
 
8.      Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
9.      Co-operation among States 
10.    Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law 
 
Additional agreements included areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, 
and the environment, as well as commercial exchanges, industrial co-operation and projects of common 
interest, as well as provisions concerning trade and industrial cooperation, the harmonization of standards 
and arbitration, and the exploration of possibilities for improving cooperation, such as in agriculture, 
energy, new technologies, the rational use of resource, transport technology and environmental concerns.  
   
UN 
 
The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of security 
communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to Thycydides, as 
hegemonia, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent and rooted in 
legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU membership becomes 
successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries as potential new EU 
neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq very closely, but 
showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of strength in soft 
power, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively participating in 
the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help Iraq on the path 
of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While the US has 
obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these topics, the 
“shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appeared to have interfered with the motivation 
of Iraq’s multiple (tribal etc.) actors (and those of some of their neighbors) to jointly participate in their 
country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead favor asymmetrical warfare 
against the occupation instead) during the first few years. Some of these countries implicated in this 
interference, such as Syria, are EMP-member states, which explains the broader effect of the current Iraq 
war on regional stability, not only transatlantically, but also in the Euro-Mediterranean.  
          Furthermore, in the interest of this potentially ever “widening” European security “region” (now 
potentially including Syria, Iran and Iraq, as mentioned above, as potentially new EU-neighbors) the EU, 
through its Neighborhood Policy (of which the EMP is the specialized regional program), intends to assist 
Iraq by focusing mainly on the rehabilitation of basic services, support of the political process, including 
elections, support of job creation and of Iraqi capacity building and humanitarian assistance (Ibid.).  
          The irony will not be lost on the reader that these are actually also the very programs and intentions 
the US had for Iraq – but proceeded to impose them “top down” on Iraq without, I claim, securing the 
absolutely essential “mutual constitution” between agent, structure, interests and identity in this process. 
This is an inconvenient  and time consuming process indeed, which may have to be modified or even 
largely sacrificed, when time is of the essence in  an acute security threat.  However, the establishement 
and effort in the maintenance of a long and trusting relationship between unequals, such as countries in 
MENA and the US may be more legitimate in the longterm and hence have greater longterm benefits, than 
a hasty and poorly thought-out and implemented hard power initiative. This may be especially true in 
political relationships in the southern Mediterranean, partially of a difference in the perception of “time” 
between the “old” continent and the “new” world in matters of progress (or perhaps, for no other reason, 
for the “old” continent not being able to afford to waste resources blindly). With other words, despite 
similar interests between the EU and the US as actors, their different identities inform different processes, 
leading to different structural outcomes at times, especially with respect to some initiatives in the greater 
Middle East. 
         One of the greatest security threats to Europe today, despite and because of events surrounding the 
Iraq invasion, would be a disrupted trans-Atlantic relationship due to a potential ideological fall-out. The 
Cold War and its nuclear stalemate as central to the European security community have changed now into 10 
 
an acute threat from the potential use of WMDs, especially in asymmetrical warfare globally, and 
potentially with respect to a revisionist Russia. Security today needs to be approached differently to 
respond effectively to the needs and threats in the contemporary Mediterranean (including taking into 
consideration the re-emergent activities of Russia) from the military to the environmental, politico-
economic and the socio-cultural of the societal sphere.  
 
 The Transatlantic Euro-Med Dimension post-Cold War: NATO 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been responsible for territorial defense of Europe 
and "peace-making" after the Cold War, while since 1999 the European Union is responsible for the 
implementation of missions; i.e. peace-keeping, policing of treaties etc. 
1996:  At their June meetings, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers decided that  
      NATO’s internal adaptation would involve building the European Security and 
Defense Identity within NATO, in order for the European Allies’ shared  
           responsibility to be expressed more effectively and coherently in their  contribution to 
the missions and activities of the Alliance, and reinforce the transatlantic partnership.  
 
           This “New-look” NATO has been described as a  
 process of redefining the organisation’s role and operation” (Europa-website New-
look NATO”, 8/19/2008), recognizing a European defense identity, strengthening the 
European component of the transatlantic security system, the new role of the WEU, as 
well as NATO’s eastern enlargement  and its establishment of a stable and sustainable 
partnership with Russia and Ukraine, as well as NATO deepening its relations with 
third countries, e.g. through Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue 
programs. 
 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative 
In comparison, NATO’s mandate also shifted post-Cold War from defending a clearly delimited territory 
to a new strategy of committing member states to defend  
      unbounded interests beyond Europe’s theater of operations: NATO’s new mandate 
is as global as the Western interests it has pledged to defend … [implying] that the 
Arab world will received its fair share of NATO attention … [such as] crisis operations 
… to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises (which could affect Euro-
Atlantic stability) at an early stage (El-Gawhary 1999, 16/7). 
 
NATO changed post-Cold War from that of a collective defense organization to a collective security 
organization, seeking to avoid new polarizations and the creation of new dividing lines between formers 
friends and foes, but to seek cooperation between former adversaries through integration in Allied 
progress, e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and special relationships as mechanisms for exporting stability 
to new member countries. 
             NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative specifically was formally launched in December 1994 as the 
“Mediterranean Dialogue” (“Dialogue”), reflecting the alliance’s recognition of the Mediterranean’s 
unique regional security challenges. The Dialogue was also intended to reach out to non-NATO member 
countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO’s Mediterranean security and stability 
projects. These “partners” would not be allies at the beginning but would be involved in confidence 
building programs, to become members when some major qualifications were met, e.g. irreversible 
commitments to democracy, civilian control of the military and development of a nation’s military 
capability to a level of interoperability with those of NATO members” (Kaplan 1999, 195). 
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Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (Source: Boening 2008a) 
 
            The “soft” power ideas and programs of the EMP/UMed to co-constitute structures for peace hence 
would be balanced in an EMRSC e.g. with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is indivisible within the 
Euro-Atlantic region”
6 as a pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) as well as the (now favored) non-Article 5 
missions of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more 
identifiable external threats”. This goes back to the Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an 
international morality superior to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8) 
– and it has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN Security 
Council approval (especially after the U.S. overcame this restraint on national action with the invasion of 
Iraq with limited success at the time of this writing, partially due to this unilateralism). 
          The  ESDP  exists  as  the  bridge  to  the EU’s hard power options, ranging from previously only 
national militaries and NATO on the one hand, and the EU’s soft power approach on the other. While the 
EMP’s approach has been basically one of soft-power, focusing on economic and social assistance through 
the EU’s MEDA, NATO per se overall also boasts U.S. military hard power capabilities, while NATO’s 
Mediterranean Dialogue on the other hand aims to build confidence and cooperation. Vasconcelos (2008, 
8) suggests questioning the understanding of, and consensus on comprehensive security by EMP member 
states, i.e. whether e.g. the post-9/11 security perspective are really law and order related.  
 
 
 
                                                           
      
6  Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible” 
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Mediterranean Intra- and Inter-Regional Relations   
Romano Prodi, as then President of the European Commission, in a speech at Louvain University in 
November 2002, stated that there is not demarcation line between some Mediterranean countries and 
others, but that the Mediterranean is  
 a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic 
region stretching from Spain to the black sea and the Persian Gulf, … [a region that] 
must not start from a closed, one-sided Eurocentric position; [but that] we must base 
our approach on a certain idea of belonging together which in essence already exists 
within the processes already under way, but needs to be bolstered with firmness and 
vision (First Jordan 2002). 
 
These words, as an “authoritative speech act” in terms of securitization (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
1998), identify the multi-lateral Mediterranean “region” as one of belonging together socio-economically 
as well as politically in terms of a zone of peace, viewed from its inter-regional aspect towards 
neighboring regions. 
          Integration theories are meso-theories rather than relying on a single universal theory to explain 
collective decision-making of political actors in distinct national settings who are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new center (E. Haas 1961, 1958). These political actors 
still exercise rational choice (i.e. they are utility maximizers with exogenously determined preferences. 
such as the national interest and the relative power of a state remaining significant, even in the EU) in new 
regional arrangements. Regional integration is also not static, but a dynamic process, both path-dependent 
on the context of the historical period, the sociological actors (state and non-state), and the specific issues 
involved.    
             The main thesis suggested here is that regional integration is taking place to the point of a regional 
security complex being established among EMP-member countries
7 (Boening 2008a and 2008b) (compare 
Appendix 1). This would represent a revision of the Middle East Regional Security Complex suggested by 
Buzan and Waever (2003). The study is significant for two reasons: First, this paper focuses on the Euro-
Mediterranean region and the role of the European Union and its southern Mediterranean neighbors 
(“MENA”) in the context of the EMP in “constructing” this space, and hereby giving it meaning in the 
context of regional stability. Secondly, this integration could additionally lead to a reciprocal “re-
construction” of EMP members’ self-identity and interests in the structural context of a Euro-
Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC). 
 
                                                           
       
7 EMP-membership at its founding in 1995 consisted of the European Union (EU) member states, plus Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Libya (as an observer), Morocco, the  Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. 
        The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as of September 2008 consisted of the twenty-seven EU member states, three EU-
Candidate States: Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, and eleven Mediterranean Partners: Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Libya has had observer status since 1999. 
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Figure 2: Euro-Mediterranean region (Source: Wikipedia) 
 
                  If  such  as  Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex can be traced to have evolved 
through the dynamics of EMP activities, it would also have potential reverberations vis-à-vis a 
transatlantic “umbilicus” as a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC). I 
operationalize an EMRSC and an EMRSSC by analyzing the levels and sectors in the EMP, as suggested 
in the literature on RSCT (Ibid.) (Boening 2008a, and 2008b). 
          The analysis of an EMRSC, i.a. through the dynamics of the EMP, can be traced in several ways. 
First, the EMP seeks to achieve economic harmonization to optimize development through neoliberal and 
functional interdependence, such as a Free Trade Area (aimed for by 2010). Secondly, it re-constituted the 
actors and structures in member countries through social-cultural rapprochement, and increased facilities 
for the movement of people (and hopefully labor under the potential terms of the UMed). Thirdly, it 
involves beyond traditional political aspects of military security/hard power (such as through intra-
regional harmonization within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue) and the evolving ESDP, also 
constructivist dynamics of regional security complex sectors and levels. Fourth, taken as a whole, these 
dynamics have characteristics of a security community, which involves, according to the new framework 
for security analysis (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998), additional security sectors such as members 
emphasizing the development of civil society, the securitization of food, water, finances, energy and the 
environment.  
         These are addressed in an EMRSC on a number of levels and can be analyzed i.a. through neo-
hegemonic and Second/Third Generation Regionalism theories in terms of their inter-regional 
significance, such as vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Russia or Latin 
America. 
         While this paper focuses on the Euro-Med, it does not exist in a vacuum but has an inter-regional 
dimension.  There are two aspects to this discussion: the EMP-internal transformations, and the 
interregional interactions between the EMP and neighboring regional organizations. Intra-regional EMP 
transformations pertain e.g. to the status of Turkey as EMP-member, or Turkey as additionally an EU-
member state one day as well. This will re-define the entire south-eastern neighborhood of the EU, 
whereby i.a. Iran, Syria and Iraq will be the EU’s neighborhood. Schumacher 2004, 99) suggests that this 
would require the EU not  
to limit itself to a mere political dialogue and trade agreement with Iran, and … 
[not] continue to treat war-torn Iraq simply as a recipient of reconstruction aid, thereby 
leaving the country in the power sphere of the occupying powers… [but rather that] the 
EU will have to consider redefining the EMP’s geographic scope and transforming it 
into a more inclusive and flexible Euro-Middle East Partnership.
8 (italics added) 
 
                                                           
      
8 compare also Neugart and Schumacher (2004) 
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Schumacher (2004, 100) suggests that this would involve redesigning the EMP’s intergovernmental 
framework with enhanced bi-, and/or multilateral inter-, intra and sub-regional cooperation layers/rings of 
cooperation, such as an enhanced infrastructure within this partnership and as well as within the south-
south dimension, including transport enhancements to support its economic aspirations and 
interdependence. Additionally, the intra- and interregional socio-political evolution on these levels would 
need to be furthered through confidence-building measures, and intercultural learning, including intra-
Arab civil society cooperation (Schumacher 2004, 101). Coherence and coordination within the EMP 
would give a much broader base in managing regional post-“Operation Iraq Freedom” stability. These 
statements, as a further “authoritative speech act” from a research institution focusing on the Euro-Med, 
not only views the EMP as the preeminent institutional framework in the Euro-Mediterranean to develop 
this enhanced socio-political and economic infrastructure in the widest sense.    
           The inter-regional aspect involves e.g. the status of the Middle East Peace Process. There are a 
number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) overlapping with the EMP, from the EU to e.g. the 
Arab Maghreb Union, which seeks South-South integration through a sub-regional free trade area 
(Gillespie 2000, 95). The African Union, whose Protocol of 2002 relating to the establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council represents the start for building a formal security cooperation (Attina 2005, 7 
and 16) within a regional security partnership encompassing fifty-three state, including the prevention, 
management and resolution of African conflicts, including early warning and preventative diplomacy to 
promote peace, security and stability. 
          Attina (2004, 2), in studying the constructive processes of the Euro-Mediterranean security system, 
utilizes analytical approaches of other regional security systems and regional security partnerships from a 
comparative perspective. He points out that 
 the existence of different multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean 
is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security 
project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other 
multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for 
building the Mediterranean security system (Ibid.) 
 
through an evaluation on the basis of their level of institutionalization of security cooperation and 
members’ social integration (Ibid.).  
 
The Adriatic Sea Partnership 
The Adriatic Sea Partnership is an example of an intra-regional “region” within the Mediterranean. It 
represents a political deepening, through mainly epistemic cooperation. It was initiated in March 2006 by 
the Slovenian Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning as a protective approach against the 
environmental challenges to this sensitive and vulnerable marine ecosystem, modeled as an elaboration of 
the positive experiences with the Sva River Basin Initiative (MAP Bureau 2006, 1) in terms of integrating 
the Adriatic under the UN’s Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development (Ibid.). This institution 
would coordinate national and international public and private level institutions of involved shareholders, 
such as financial, waste water management, integrated coastal zone management, etc. (Ibid., 205). 
 
The Black Sea Synergy Initiative 
The Black Sea Synergy Initiative
9 was established in 2007 to deal with the opportunities and challenges 
of the region, which is “rich in natural resources and strategically located at the junction of Europe, 
Central Asia and the Middle East (Commission of the European Communities 2007).  The EU Council in 
its conclusions of 18/19 June 2007 welcomed the initiatives aimed at strengthening a coherent EU 
engagement towards the Black Sea area. The Council pointed out that they explicitly recommend building 
on the experience gained through the Barcelona Process (as well as lessons learnt in the Northern 
                                                           
9 The Black Sea region comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine. 15 
 
Dimension of the ENP) to extend synergies with other regional cooperation processes, as the EU-
accession process by Turkey, the ENP as well as the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation are 
of relevance to the EU.  
 
The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership 
The  EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is a further southern extension of the ENP beyond the 
Neighborhood, and in this case specifically the EMP, (European Commission: EU-Africa Summit 2007), 
to provide a long-term vision to face common challenges, ranging from climate change to development, 
energy, migration, peace and security, trade and regional integration and good governance human rights, 
between the countries beyond the southern Mediterranean and the EU. These issues represent some of the 
sectors, which Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have referred to as “sectors” in operationalizing their 
new framework for security (as reflected in this book’s title under the same terminology). Additionally, 
this EU foreign policy towards the south could be explained with Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) (Buzan and Waever 2003) in terms of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a Euro-Mediteranean 
Regional Security Complex, whereby sub-Saharan Africa could be viewed as buffer-region to a Euro-
Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex under this theory. As the dynamics currently are not 
particularly intense between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, this aspect of the EMP exceeds the limits of 
this paper. 
 
         Figure 3: Sub-Saharan Africa (in beige) 
                                                     (source: www.exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/images/subsaha.... )   
           While the future geographic and political ENP-membership may be contested (Lippert 2007, 183), 
the ENP’s potential is not
10. The following sections will discuss these opportunities further. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council  
           The GCC and the EU have held regular ministerial meetings during the last two decades on issues 
of mutual interest, such as terrorism, WMDs, human rights and regional political issues pertaining to 
“ensuring security in a broad sense in a region of tension, and guaranteeing long-term prosperity and job 
creation by diversifying the economy and reducing dependence on oil income” (EU Council Interim 
Report 2006). Both the GCC and the EU view especially this area of energy and security on a regional 
basis in need of enhanced regional and a wider international dialogue, e.g. through a stronger EU 
presence, enhanced coordination and higher visibility in the Gulf states (Ibid.). The GCC financial sector 
has been partially integrated with the West through Petro-investments. Reciprocally, global financial crisis 
of autumn 2008, however, left especially some Kuwaiti banks (e.g. Gulf Bank) weakened (England 2008). 
The financial “inter-regional” role of the GCC in the EU, beyond Petro-investments, is also exemplified 
by the $10.7 bn capital injection by Libya and Qatar into Barlcays Bank (Financial Times 10/31/08), 
indicating that Arab Gulf banks are overall well capitalized). 
                                                           
      
10 Compare Senyucel et al. 2006. 16 
 
            As this interim report is an official EU document, it represents an authoritative “speech act” which 
explicitly states not only the inter-regional security significance between the EU and the GCC, but also the 
interest of the EU to especially support the mutual security concerns between these two regions. In this 
context, the EU welcomes elections in the regions (Ibid.).  
          The GCC has actively supported the EMP when brokered the Doha Agreement in 2008 to normalize 
relations between Lebanon and Israel (compare Chapter Five), facilitating the participation of both 
countries at the Mediterranean Summit in July 2008 in Paris.  
 
Select Special Powers and the Mediterranean 
 
U.S. 
As the Doha negotiations have broken down since the writing of this paper, the complexity of trade 
liberalization and integration as a function of regional trade have been highlighted. Tovias (2008, 39) has 
elaborated on the strategic consequences of cross-regional free trade agreements in that it expands the 
influence of larger powers in regions beyond their past spheres, and lessens the dependence of smaller 
powers on previous alliances.  
This remarkable change in the trade policies of both large and small countries could led in 
the medium term to a sort of meltdown of still-existing, although loose, spheres of influence 
(such as the one the EU has in the Southern Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa or the 
US in North and Central America) (Tovias 2008, 39). 
 
As least developed countries tend to be losers in these dynamics, since “neither economic powers nor 
emerging economies consider” (Ibid.) their markets worthwhile to be included in an FTA, it should be a 
caveat for the EMP in the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean FTA to avoid this temptation and the 
socio-political repercussions it might bring. Additionally, these dynamics gain salience by the U.S. Middle 
East Free Trade Area Agreement (formerly proposed in 2003, to be implementation within ten years), 
which broadens the U.S. influence in MENA beyond the military influence and specific petroleum trade, 
with broader trade agreements as well. 
         The  concept  of  hegemony,  based  on  control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of 
security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to 
Thycydides, as hegemonia, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent 
and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries 
as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq 
very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of 
strength in soft power, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively 
participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help 
Iraq on the path of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While 
the US has obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these 
topics, the “shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appeared to have interfered with the 
motivation of Iraq’s multiple (tribal etc.) actors (and those of some of their neighbors) to jointly participate 
in their country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead favor asymmetrical 
warfare against the occupation instead) during the first few years. Some of these countries implicated in 
this interference, such as Syria, are EMP-member states, which explains the broader effect of the current 
Iraq war on regional stability, not only transatlantically, but also in the Euro-Mediterranean.  
            The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of 
security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to 
Thycydides, as hegemonia, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent 
and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries 
as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq 17 
 
very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of 
strength in soft power, the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively 
participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help 
Iraq on the path of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While 
the US has obviously had endless meetings with Iraq and its neighbors since 2003 (if not before) on these 
topics, the “shock and awe”-effect of the Anglo military engagement appeared to have interfered with the 
motivation of Iraq’s multiple (tribal etc.) actors (and those of some of their neighbors) to jointly participate 
in their country’s future structural continuities and processes (and appear to instead favor asymmetrical 
warfare against the occupation instead) during the first few years. Some of these countries implicated in 
this interference, such as Syria, are EMP-member states, which explains the broader effect of the current 
Iraq war on regional stability, not only transatlantically, but also in the Euro-Mediterranean.  
 
The Caribbean/APC Countries 
The comprehensiveness of EU development cooperation consists of three elements and are intended to 
synergistically put into action relevant UN resolutions: 
  The European development policy agreed on by the European Commission and EU 
development ministers in the Development Council in 2000 
  The new Cotonou Agreement (which replaces the Lome’ convention) agreed upon 
between the EU and seventy-eight African, Caribbean and Pacific (APC) countries, 
entering into effect on April 1, 2003. 
            The key objective of the Cotonou Agreement is the reduction of poverty through an innovative 
economic and trade cooperation framework which supports regional integration and cooperation efforts 
between ACP countries to help them integrate gradually into the world economy, partially by paving the 
way for increased foreign direct investments to which the EU contributes. Peace-building and conflict 
prevention policies and migration issues have also been introduced into this agreement (Ibid.). 
 
Russia 
The current Russian-EU relationship is based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 
1994 (entering into force on December 1, 1997), which regulates their political, economic and cultural 
relationship.  The Russian Federation (“Russia”), as a regional power in its own right, has pivotal 
economic relationships towards the West both with Europe and in the wider Mediterranean region. The 
substantial economic relationship between the EU and Russia involved
11 e.g. seventy-five percent FDIs 
from EU-MSs
12, and is tightly interlinked with the EU-Russian political relationship due to Russia’s 
strategic use of its petroleum exports. However, the alarm over its peaceful intentions which Russia raised 
in Europe following its operations in Georgia in late summer of 2008 endangered Europe’s trust, and as 
Russia appears to realize of late, this reciprocally might slow down the successor agreement to the PCA, 
as a “deep and comprehensive economic integration agreement between the EU and n economies” 
(European Commission – External Trade 2008, 1), which was envisioned for the first half of 2008. An 
additional consequence of these recent political and economic crises might also be the progress of Russia’s 
WTO membership aspirations.  The complexity of the EU-Russian relationship became further 
complicated as a result of the global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, which saw a substantial fall in 
petroleum prices. This appears to have moderated the Russian revisionist assertiveness of the August 2008 
Georgian crisis in favor of a more cooperative tone by early fall 2008. 
           Judging by Russia’s more conciliatory tone at that time, it appears that Russia understands that  it 
can ill afford European distrust at this stage is something, especially under conditions of the “perfect 
storm” with halfing gas prices (as Russia’s prime source of income), a global financial system which 
appears to simultaneously have lost much investor confidence (especially pertaining to foreign direct 
                                                           
    
11 While the research for this paper concluded in the summer of 2008, Georgian-Russian crisis of August 2008  is recognized as 
reducing investor confidence in Russia. Additionally, it impeded the signing of the replacement of the current PCA. 
    
12  such as the liberalization of the state-controlled electricity industry through the sale of strategic stakes to “foreign power 
groups, such as Germany’s E.on, Italy’s Enel, and” (Wagstyl 2008c) the Finnish Forum (in addition to big Russian investors). 18 
 
investments in Russia, under domestic economic conditions which had not matured since the Cold War): 
With shrinking revenues, any country’s soft as well as hard security can be compromised
13, especially in 
countries relying on oil exports.  
 
Neo-Hegemonic Regionalism 
 
The end of the Cold War and with it that of the global power bipolarity “led to systemic transformations 
reshaping the global order” (Reus-Smit 2005, 195), and with it questions about the “dynamics of 
international change, the nature of basic institutional practices, the role of non-state agency and the 
problem of human rights” (Ibid.).                 
          While some previous cooperative endeavors in the Mediterranean region were less successful (e.g. 
the Western Mediterranean Forum), it has been argued that as a result there was an  
     absence of a strong web of regional interaction at state and non-state levels, … the cross-
cutting strategic interests of the key states involved … and the low and strongly asymmetrical 
rate of economic integration between the two shares of the Mediterranean Sea (Christiansen, 
Petito and Tonra 2000, 403) 
 
 were contributing factors. The institutional and ideological structures of the EMP on the other hand were 
designed to address the weaknesses observed in other cooperative efforts in this region. In fact we observe 
how the ideational structures of the EMP influence, democratic institutionalization as well as their 
norming effect e.g. on gender relations, the enhanced integration of market economics, and 
environmentally protective measures. 
         I would argue that in order to transcend millennia of clashes in the Euro-Med, I suggest exploring the 
possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to identify 
post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course the post-
Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the traditional referent object in matters of war and peace has 
been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution of interests, identities, 
agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as decisive in the security 
community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2). In the post-Cold War environment, despite the continuing nuclear 
and terrorist threat, mutually assured destruction is not necessarily assumed by state actors, and hence 
deterrence is not necessarily the primary motivation in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the possibility of 
escaping from this limited military perspective is explored by both, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the 
EMP, which acknowledge other securitizing factors, e.g. environment or citizens’ welfare and 
governments.  
         The complementarity of these two multilateral IGOs in the Mediterranean, reduces transaction costs 
by avoiding duplication of the security and defense mechanisms. This advantage in the efficiency of 
harmonizing among members reduces the power balancing maneuvers of the Cold War, which consumed 
so many resources that could be much better spent on the development of human capital in the south and 
eastern regions of the Mediterranean. Instead, the multi-lateral mechanisms of the Dialogue and the EMP 
enable the Mediterranean security community to move beyond the retaliatory rhetoric of the Cold War to 
contribute to regional stability available for the socio-economic development of this region, and reduce 
e.g. the dividing lines between north and south which i.e. the demographic developments
14 bring through 
more graduated responses. 
         The EMP is primarily a regional multilateral mechanism, enhanced by bilateral relations between 
member states. The fact that the US and the former Soviet Union both were essentially its godparents 
                                                           
     
13 It must be noted that Russia had created a stabilization fund in 2003 at the start of the rise in petroleum prices, and “paid off 
the accumulated state debts and amassed gold and foreign curreny reserves” (Gaidar 2008), giving it a cushion to cope with 
unfavorable economic changes. 
     
14 i.e. countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean find it difficult to provide (gender equal) basic education amidst the  
great population growth in their region  - and hereby adequately address the social and security challenge this represents to the 
northern Mediterranean countries. 19 
 
rather invalidates some claims (e.g. Crawford 2005) that the EMP is an imperialistic tool of the EU to out-
do the US. However, the synergy between the EU and MENA member states makes it a truly cooperative 
Euro-Mediterranean project, rather than the reverse of this hypothesis as one might suspect, a “colonial 
project” by the US or the Soviet Union.  
         Ulla Holm (2004, 1) views the dialectic faced by the EU in the Mediterranean in terms of the tension 
in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict 
laden zone, interlinked with the discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through a model to copy 
rather than an empire-builder through respect for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty while exporting 
political shared European values. The relationship between security and regional stability is well known, 
was it not the basis of the Truman Doctrine for Europe (Coufudakis 2004, 235). With the Maastricht 
Treaty the EU’s self-appointed mission arose to propagate human rights and democracy through the 
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and to foster fundamental freedoms 
within the framework of cooperation policy. This became one of the explicit objectives of the emerging 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 2005).  
           
Third Generation Regionalism      
 
Referencing the sectors and levels proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) in their new 
framework for security analysis, the “levels” pertaining to a theoretical EMRSC are i.a. the sub/intra-
regional (e.g. from some viewpoints the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the inter-regional (e.g. the Euro-
Mediterranean region and the Black Sea region), the bilateral level (e.g. France and Morocco), the 
international level (i.e. the foreign relations among the states within and outside the regions in question), 
and, lastly, as Van Langenhove (2008b) proposed, a neo-Westphalian level. This last level is from a 
viewpoint of global governance where the world of states gradually becomes “a world of states and of 
regions” (Van Langenhove 2008a, 115) (italics added. The concept initially of neo-Westphalian “Second 
Generation Regionalism” (Van Langenhove 2008b) identified integration in non-economic matters such as 
justice, security, culture (Ibid.). An emerging EMRSC then could be interpreted as evolving into a “Third 
Generation Regionalism” (Costea and Van Langenhove 2007) in some parts of the world, whereby the 
regional institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences of regional policies would 
become fully consolidated. As such regions become more proactive engaging in inter-regional 
arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues, with a multidimensional character with 
the potential to affect more relations at the global level. Ultimately in third generation regional integration, 
regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. (Ibid.), and exhibit a greater “global 
governance” identity.   
                      
Conclusions: Transnational Political Will in the Euro-Med later 
 
Mediterranean Regionalism 
The Euro-Mediterranean as a region is not only significant from the regional level on the basis of shared 
history and a common future, but also from an inter-regional perspective vis-à-vis the strategic 
significance of neighboring regions, as well as the reciprocal security effects on it from a global level. 
Although threats might seem distant from the homelands in the Euro-Med, some global threats need to be 
addressed through a coherent (regional EU-Mediterranean) policy to effectively address these challenges, 
and act on the international stage, not only as pro-active measures, but also “in order to take greater 
responsibility in promoting peace and stability, or, put another way, its won ‘core values’” (Senyucel 
2006, 6) (italics added). 
          In the past the Euro-Mediterranean region had not been the object of extensive regional analysis, 
because it was viewed as not sharing cultural and institutional homogeneity. Nevertheless, “new 
regionalism gained ground in the 1990s, and the Mediterranean area has been increasingly considered by 
researchers as a region in which cooperation is in progress and institution-building is feasible and 
desirable” (Attina 2007, 198). However, the perception of the Mediterranean as a region has been debated 20 
 
among scholars: either EU action in the Mediterranean has been interpreted as a European hegemonic act, 
while other scholars interpret the EMP as socialization of its member states as a response to globalization 
in order to make the Euro-Med region a more effective economic block. In view of the privatization 
efforts starting in the 1980s, which followed the economic crises of the 1970s, as well as in light of the 
“consequent reforms of national economies, based on deregulation and restructuring imposed by the 
developed states, … world economics and financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank” (Attina 2007, 198), the economic argument is a strong one.  
          Additionally, Mediterranean regional analysis cannot be separated from security considerations. The 
asymmetries existing between EMP members from the northern Mediterranean as compared to the 
southern Mediterranean are recognized as placing the European economies in a dominant position and 
forcing other economies to adapt to their interest, “at least until the former reach high industrialization 
standards and fully integrate into the world economy” (Ibid.). The EMP, as part of the European 
Neighborhood and its aim to surround the EU with a circle of stable and prosperous countries could be 
viewed as empowering EMP member states (MSs) in MENA to even out North-South discrepancies. 
1.  There are multiple multilateral structures in the Euro-Med, such as the UN declarations to which 
its members have subscribed. 
2.  The EMP as an EU-MENA multilateral IGO to stabilize and harmonize and support development 
3.  NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, broadening Euro-Med region transatlantically beyond the 
traditional US involvement in the Middle East. It is significant today on many respondents view the role 
of the US’s hard power – as more significant than the EU’s soft power is viewed in MENA frequently as 
trumping soft power. 
           Despite this relation that multilateral  institutionalism in the  region beyond Euro-Med, enhanced 
by the new UMed its inter-regional potential is not yet projected, as many intra-regional (South-South) 
linkages are weak due to traditional hostilities (e.g. conflicts in Western Sahara, the Israel-Palestine, or 
the Lebanon-Syria). Yet the interregional potential is not necessarily optional in developing: as oil 
resources will diminish in some parts of the Middle East, it will need to be integrated in the region 
beyond traditional bilateral links or those with select western partners. 
            While throughout the evolution of the EMP some of its member states have increasingly set “more 
collective goals and ambitions, not least in external spheres such as defence, previously shielded from 
colleticve decision-making, if not collective action, … the gap between expectations and capabilities
15, 
between declaratory policy and its implementation” (Spencer 2001, 13) in the EU has been lamented in the 
EU as a foreign actor, e.g. during the first years of the EMP.  Spencer (Ibid.) suggests that this could i.a. 
be related to an absence of ‘political will’ (as concrete incentives and penalties attached to action) either in 
the beginning or during the progress of a policy’s implementation. The EU as a security actor in the 
Mediterranean shows the blurring of the internal and external security agendas
16 (Spencer 2001, 14), 
which vary according to their (inter-)national context, sometimes quickly. While in the Mediterranean at 
times migration topped the security agenda, recently oil has also risen (again) towards the top, and with it 
the EMP’s inter-regional poignancy in terms of new actors’ alliances in the region (e.g. Russia’s 
cooperation with Libyan exploration) or renewed inter-regional alignments (e.g. Turkey’s “turnstile”-role 
vis-avis the Black Sea region, becoming ever more significant – and subject to realignment - with the 
recent destabilization in the Caucasus. 
            Some  authors  such  as  Spencer  (2001, 9) suggest approaching the EMP not from an internal 
perspective, but rather view it in the context of the broader challenges facing the EU as a full-fledged 
security actor, especially as a process rather than substance (Ibid., 10). Her words in 2001 (Ibid., 11) that 
“the EU needs to reassess the EMP in a context which goes beyond the parameters of the Barcelona 
template alone” are particularly prophetic in light of the events of August 2008 in Georgia and Syria’s 
immediate consultations with Russia following the latter’s invasion.  
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            Throughout the evolution of the EMP some of its member states have increasingly set “more 
collective goals and ambitions, not least in external spheres such as defence, previously shielded from 
collective decision-making, if not collective action, … the gap between expectations and capabilities
17, 
between declaratory policy and its implementation” (Spencer 2001, 13) in the EU (as some have lamented 
about the EU as a foreign actor, especially during the first years of the EMP).  Spencer (Ibid.) suggests 
that this could i.a. be related to an absence of ‘political will’ (as an absence of concrete incentives and 
penalties attached to action) either in the beginning or during the progress of a policy’s implementation. 
The EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean shows the blurring of the internal and external security 
agendas
18 (Spencer 2001, 14), which vary according to their (inter-) national context, sometimes quickly. 
While in the Mediterranean at times migration topped the security agenda, recently oil has also risen 
(again) towards the top, and with it the EMP’s inter-regional poignancy in terms of new actors’ alliances 
in the region (e.g. Russia’s cooperation with Libyan exploration) or renewed inter-regional alignments 
(e.g. Turkey’s “turnstile”-role vis-avis the Black Sea region, becoming ever more significant – and subject 
to realignment - with the recent destabilization in the Caucasus. 
          Spencer (2001, 14), among other authors, recognizes geographical proximity as contributing to a 
“blurring of purely internal and external security agendas, particularly in an area of key concern to the EU, 
namely the very human issue of migration in all its dimensions”. This necessitates i.a. addressing the 
economic insufficiencies of the “sending” states which lead to emigration out of this despair (i.e. mostly 
from northern Africa to the southern EU), and cooperating in the repatriation of these EU-immigrants. 
Joffé (2001, 48) points out that this is one reason why the EU is not taking a stronger stand on civil society 
and political reform expectations towards MENA, i.e. in order not to have e.g. social reforms by 
themselves disrupt a regional security identity. Of course, some authors (such as Chourou 2001, 58) doubt 
that “security ought to be on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda at all” unless they are very long-term 
considerations and that  participation must be open to all countries that have clear stakes in the issues to be 
discussed, even if such countries are not Mediterranean in strict geographical terms. He further advocates 
that non-EU Mediterranean countries must negotiate as a single entity if a genuine partnership is to be set 
up between the shores of the Mediterranean (Chourou 2001, 59/60).   
           Additionally, the intra- and interregional socio-political evolution on these levels would need to be 
furthered through confidence-building measures, and intercultural learning, including intra-Arab civil 
society cooperation (Schumacher 2004, 101). Coherence and coordination within the EMP would give a 
much broader base in managing regional post-“Operation Iraq Freedom” stability. These statements, as a 
further “authoritative speech act” from a research institution focusing on the Euro-Med, not only views the 
EMP as the preeminent institutional framework in the Euro-Mediterranean to develop this enhanced socio-
political and economic infrastructure in the widest sense.    
          In this context, the EMP/UMed are a manifestation of what van Langenhove (2008) has termed not 
a post-Westphalian world order, but a neo-Westphalian world order:  
   The old world of states has made positive developments in governance, but has also created 
what Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen called an illusion of destiny that has 
resulted in incredible violence. The multiple world of regions could be a way to replace the 
illusion of a single national identity with the more realist view that people hold plural 
regional identities. As such, the world of regions might not only be a more complex world 
but also one with more chances of peace and freedom. (van Langenhove 2008, 15). 
 
          It is being recognized transatlantically that America will not single-handedly shape a New World 
Order (SpiegelOnline 4/19/2003) as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism 
appears to be developing in many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with the potential 
for a more democratic paradigm through which to approach new and old security threats of partner 
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countries – and to perhaps allay the fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of its 
imminent weakening (British Council 2008). 
          This  paradigm  would  fit  Van  Langenhove’s (2007) concept of a (hypothetical) “Third 
Regionalism”, whereby the institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences of 
regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive in engaging with inter-
regional arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues with a multidimensional 
character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. And finally, in third 
generation regional integration, regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. The EMP’s 
potential in contributing to regional security and stability, (as nested in the EU’s permanent delegation to 
the UN), despite it s brief thirteen years’ existence has the potential to consolidate the competing 
preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history and cultural and institutional structures 
existing today in the Euro-Mediterranean “region”.  
           Joffé recognizes the reciprocity between the evolution of societal values and political change, but 
he discounts the role of institutions in this process. I would point out Alexander Wendt’s (1999) and 
Ruggie’s (1998) arguments concerning the co-constitution of identities (e.g. societal, political), actors and 
structures (e.g. institutions) as the  process for social, political, economic etc. change. This reciprocal 
“construction” of a regional security identity within a EMRSC then has traditional military components, 
but also perception-based components (as social constructivists would argue) which co-constitute 
structures. A pertinent example would be the regional security implications of the current global financial 
crisis. This economic threat has the potential for severe political consequences (as did the economic crisis 
of 1929 for the Weimar Republic). Beck (2008, 2) writes that “the traditional methods of management and 
control are proving unreliable and ineffective in the face of global risks… the social and political 
explosive force of global market risks is becoming palpable. Governments are overthrown, civil wars 
become a threat.” 
          In this context, the EMP/UMed are a manifestation of what van Langenhove (2008) has termed not 
a post-Westphalian world order, but a neo-Westphalian world order:  
   The old world of states has made positive developments in governance, but has also created 
what Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen called an illusion of destiny that has 
resulted in incredible violence. The multiple world of regions could be a way to replace the 
illusion of a single national identity with the more realist view that people hold plural 
regional identities. As such, the world of regions might not only be a more complex world 
but also one with more chances of peace and freedom. (van Langenhove 2008, 15). 
 
          It is being recognized transatlantically that America will not single-handedly shape a New World 
Order (SpiegelOnline 4/19/2003) as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism 
appears to be developing in many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with the potential 
for a more democratic paradigm through which to approach new and old security threats of partner 
countries – and to perhaps allay the fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of its 
imminent weakening (British Council 2008). 
         Attina (2004, 2), in studying the constructive processes of the Euro-Mediterranean security system, 
utilizes analytical approaches of other regional security systems and regional security partnerships from a 
comparative perspective. He points out that 
 the existence of different multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean is 
pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security project, and 
the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is 
put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean 
security system (Ibid.) 
 
through an evaluation on the basis of their level of institutionalization of security cooperation and 
members’ social integration (Ibid.). 
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Appendix 2: 
Membership Comparision: EU-EMP-NAYO-Union for the Mediterranean-WTO 
(Status: September 2008) 
EU EMP EMP EU NATO Union WTO 
Member
Member 
(*= Member Candidate Member (*_ for  the Member
  founding "MENA"   Med.Dialgoue Mediterranean   
        Member) Only    Member) Member    
Albania     x           x  x 
Algeria     x*  x     x*  x    
Austria  x  x*           x  x 
Belgium  x  x*        x  x  x 
Bosnia&Herzegovina                 x    
Bulgaria  x  x        x  x  x 
Canada              x     x 
Croatia           x     x  x 
Cyprus  x  x*           x  x 
Czech Republic  x  x        x  x  x 
Denmark  x  x*        x  x  x 
England     x*        x  x  x 
Egypt     x*  x     x*  x  x 
Estonia  x  x        x  x  x 
Finland  x  x*           x  x 
France  x  x*        x  x  x 
FYR Macedonia           x     x    28 
 
Germany  x  x*        x  x  x 
Greece  x  x*        x  x  x 
Hungary  x  x*        x  x  x 
Iceland              x     x 
Ireland  x  x*           x  x 
Israel     x*  x     x*  x  x 
Italy  x  x*        x  x  x 
Jordan     x*  x     x*  x  x 
Latvia  x  x        x  x  x 
Lebanon     x*  x        x    
Libya     observer  observer        observer    
Lithuania  x  x        x  x  x 
Luxembourg  x  x*        x  x  x 
Malta  x  x*           x  x 
Mauritania     x        x*  x  x 
Monaco  x              x    
Montenegro                 x    
Morocco     x*  x     x*  x  x 
Netherlands x  x*        x  x  x 
Norway              x     x 
Palestinian Authority     observer  x         x    
Poland  x  x         x  x  x 
Portugal  x  x*        x  x  x 
Romania  x  x         x  x  x 
Slovakia  x  x         x  x  x 
Slovenia  x  x         x  x  x 
Spain  x  x*        x  x  x 
Sweden  x  x             x  x 29 
 
Syria     x*  x         x    
Tunisia     x*  x         x  x 
Turkey     x*  x  x  x  x  x 
United States              x     x 
 